



CLOSED CASE SUMMARY

ISSUED DATE: MAY 8, 2025

FROM: INTERIM DIRECTOR BONNIE GLENN
OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

CASE NUMBER: 2024OPA-0413

Allegations of Misconduct & Director's Findings

Named Employee #1

Allegation(s):		Director's Findings
# 1	5.001 - Standards and Duties, 5.001-POL 2. Employees Must Adhere to Laws, City Policy, and Department Policy	Not Sustained - Inconclusive
# 2	5.001 - Standards and Duties, 5.001-POL 15. Employees Obey any Lawful Order Issued by a Superior Officer	Sustained
Imposed Discipline		
Terminated Prior to Proposed Discipline		

This Closed Case Summary (CCS) represents the opinion of the OPA Director regarding the misconduct alleged and therefore sections are written in the first person.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Named Employee #1 (NE#1) was hired on July 3, 2024, as a probationary civilian police data technician trainee. On September 19, 2024, NE#1's probationary employment was terminated for "failing to meet training and job expectations and requirements." NE#1's supervisor, Witness Employee #1 (WE#1), assisted NE#1 with clearing her personal items from her "rolly cart."¹ While doing so, WE#1 discovered about one hundred original documents improperly stored in NE#1's rolly cart, including victim follow-up reports and insurance subrogation letters. WE#1 observed the documents were assigned to NE#1 to correct in August, but NE#1 had not made the corrections.

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE:

On February 19, 2025, the Office of Inspector General certified this investigation as thorough, timely, and objective.

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION:

OPA investigated the complaint by reviewing the original complaint documents, including email correspondence. OPA also reviewed NE#1's discharge letter. OPA interviewed WE#1 and emailed NE#1, offering her an opportunity to provide an interview. NE#1 declined to sit for an interview but provided a brief response to the allegations by email.

The original complaint included an email chain outlining how the allegations against NE#1 were discovered. NE#1 was served with her notice of dismissal on September 19, 2024. The next day, the Data Center Manager notified others on the email chain that WE#1 found "several original documents" on NE#1's rolly cart, including victim follow-up reports

¹ SPD assigned police data technicians rolling carts ("rolly carts") to store and transport personal belongings at work because employees in their unit share desk space.



and insurance subrogation letters. The Data Center Manager wrote that the reports were given to NE#1 to “correct back in August” and that Data Center employees were not “allowed to keep original SPD documents in the person[al] drawers.” WE#1 confirmed that NE#1 never corrected the reports as instructed. An SPD Human Resources Manager referred the matter to OPA on October 23, 2024.

OPA interviewed WE#1, who was NE#1’s direct supervisor. WE#1 stated NE#1 was hired with a group of four Data Center trainees, who were trained in a cohort. WE#1 described NE#1 falling behind her peers in work performance, aptitude, and attitude. WE#1 described finding about one hundred documents in NE#1’s rolly cart. WE#1 stated the Data Center has a responsibility to vet and input accurate case information for various local and national databases. WE#1 described that supervisors review these documents and may return them to subordinates to correct any errors. WE#1 stated that the documents were “originals” that a “secondary trainer” had instructed NE#1 to correct, but no corrections were made. WE#1 also stated that it was improper for NE#1 to store the documents in her rolly cart instead of properly filing them.

OPA also received an email from NE#1’s secondary trainer, a Senior Data Technician. She wrote that, on July 8, 2024, she “thoroughly” explained to NE#1 and her training cohort that “when paperwork was not fully completed it needed to be refiled.” She wrote she reminded all trainees at the end of shift that, “they needed to finish up the [paperwork] they were completing before refiling the rest that they grabbed but did not finish.” She wrote that this process and instruction repeated throughout training. She concluded, “Each trainee was fully aware of this requirement and, in my presence, continued to refile unfinished paperwork at the end of the shift.”

Finally, OPA emailed NE#1 multiple times to offer her an opportunity to interview. OPA included a copy of the classification report, which outlined that the allegations against NE#1 included “improperly storing CJIS records in her personal locker (‘rolly cart’) after having previously been instructed not to do so by a supervisor.” NE#1 ultimately declined. NE#1 finally responded, in relevant part, as follows:

I’m so sorry I couldn’t get back to you sooner. I have a new job with an insane schedule and haven’t been keeping up with emails. I really appreciate you reaching out and being willing to speak with me, but I don’t think I’ll have time to sit down and talk it through. I admit fault and understand that I broke policy, and nothing can change that. I really enjoyed my job at SPD but I let some personal things that I was going through cloud my work and judgement.

Thank you again for reaching out, please let me know if there is anything else I need to do.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:

Named Employee #1 – Allegation #1

5.001 - Standards and Duties, 5.001-POL 2. Employees Must Adhere to Laws, City Policy, and Department Policy



The Complainant alleged that NE#1 violated law and policy by storing CJIS information in her rolly cart.²

SPD Policy 5.001-POL-2 requires that employees adhere to laws, City policy, and Department policy.

OPA has insufficient information to conclude NE#1 violated the law governing the proper storage of criminal justice information. OPA was unable to determine precisely which documents NE#1 kept unsecured in her rolly cart. WE#1 described these as being about one hundred “original documents.” When asked to describe the documents, WE#1 stated they were mainly “victim follow ups,” which she described as “any documentation that we receive from victims after the officers have talked to them. So sometimes it’s like insurance letters that come in listing all of the property that they’re claiming was stolen. Sometimes it’s just like a letter from the victim saying, like, hey, here’s additional information regarding my case.” WE#1 also described NE#1 as being in the portion of her training where she was, “training in our records management system first. So that’s where we review all of the electronic police reports for accurate NIBRs reporting to the FBI, as well as entering paper reports such as collision reports that come in from officers, impounds, stolen vehicle, reports, things like that.” It is extremely concerning that NE#1 kept such a large number of original victim follow up reports unsecured in her personal rolly cart. This is especially the case because, even as a probationary trainee, NE#1 worked in the Data Center and likely had or was receiving higher-level training on the rules regulating such information. See SPD Policy 12.050-POL-3 (requiring that employees who use WACIC/NCIC terminals be certified). However, without more specific evidence concerning the information contained in the documents found in NE#1’s rolly cart—not just a general category of documents—OPA cannot conclude NE#1 violated the law.

Accordingly, OPA recommends this allegation be Not Sustained – Inconclusive.

Recommended Finding: **Not Sustained – Inconclusive**

Named Employee #1 – Allegation #2

5.001 - Standards and Duties, 5.001-POL 15. Employees Obey any Lawful Order Issued by a Superior Officer

The Complainant alleged that NE#1 was insubordinate by failing to follow the instruction of superiors to properly store SPD documents and complete work in a timely manner.

SPD Policy 5.001-POL-15 requires that Department employees obey any lawful order issued by a superior officer. The failure to do so constitutes insubordination.

OPA finds, by more than a preponderance of the evidence, that NE#1 failed to follow the lawful orders issued to her by superiors.

First, three members of the Data Center—WE#1, the Senior Data Technician, and the Data Center Manager—all stated that storing original records in a rolly cart was prohibited. The Senior Data Technician described providing this instruction to NE#1 and her cohort multiple times and observing that they were aware of this rule. NE#1 also admitted violating this policy in her email to OPA. Finally, the fact that NE#1 had failed to make required corrections to these

² The OPA classification notice also referenced NE#1, “regularly vaping within the SPD HQ building and instructing another employees not to disclose her actions.” These were among the reasons for which NE#1 was already terminated, and NE#1 admitted the conduct in her email to OPA. To the extent NE#1 may have committed state or local infractions by doing so, see SMC 10.64.020 and RCW 70.160.030, OPA considers that matter adjudicated and resolved by SPD.



documents—coupled with her low performance as a probationary employee—suggests a motive of “noble corruption” for hiding these documents, perhaps intending to store them properly after she completed them.

Second, as described by WE#1, NE#1 was instructed to make specific corrections to these documents. NE#1 failed to do so. OPA finds that, more likely than not, NE#1 hid the documents in her rolly cart rather than admit fault. This was also insubordinate.

Accordingly, OPA recommends this allegation be Sustained.

Recommended Finding: **Sustained**